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Abstract 
This study examines the differential response of various international financial 
flows to the post 9/11 episode of terrorism in the context of a South Asian country. 
Using monthly data for the period from January 2003 to December 2014, we 
analyze the impact of terrorism in Pakistan on the inflows of foreign direct 
investment (FDI), portfolio investments, and migrant remittances.  We find that FDI 
decreases substantially as a result of terrorist activity, whereas portfolio 
investments show little change. In contrast, migrant remittances show a significant 
increase. These differences are also evident in financial flows from major source 
regions and top sending countries. The results are robust to the use of alternative 
definitions and indicators of terrorism as well as the inclusion of various 
macroeconomic variables. These findings indicate that foreign private capital flees 
an economy suffering from terrorism whereas migrant remittances are the only 
financial flows that increase during difficult times. 
 
Keywords: Terrorism; 9/11; FDI; Portfolio investment; Remittances; Developing 
countries; Pakistan. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, literature has increasingly focused on the 
economic cost of terrorism. Terrorist activity is reported to have hit economic 
growth in both  developing and developed countries and regions around the world 
(Abadie and Gardeazabal 2003; Eckstein and Tsiddon 2004; Crain and Crain 
2006; Gaibulloev and Sandler 2008). This fall in growth of output occurs through 
multiple channels: Domestic consumption is increasingly diverted to security and 
defence spending  leading  to a larger government presence and greater budget 
deficits (Blomberg et al. 2004; Eckstein and Tsiddon 2004; Gupta et al. 2004) 
Investment in the economy drops due to higher production costs and growing 
interest rates; non defence-related production suffers, and the financial sector is 
crippled by rising transaction costs and scrutiny as well as documentation 
requirements (Eldor and Melnick 2004; Johnston and Nedelescu 2006).  
 
Another channel through which terrorism can hurt an open economy is decrease in 
international financial flows to the terrorism-afflicted country. Financial flows, 
whether foreign direct investments (FDI), portfolio capital, or migrant remittances 
can all alter in the face of terrorism (Abadie and Gardeazabal 2008; Enders and 
Sandler 1996; Enders, Parise and Sandler 1992).  
 The direction and magnitude of the reaction of different foreign financial flows to 
terrorism may vary depending on the nature of those flows as well as the motives 
behind them. The degree to which financial flows respond to terrorism-induced 
economic shocks may determine the macroeconomic stability of a developing 
economy. This is of particular significance to capital-deficient developing countries 
that are heavily reliant on foreign financial flows, both for promoting growth and 
covering chronic current account deficits. During the early 2000s, international 
financial flows to developing countries grew substantially. At the same time, a new 
form of terrorist activity came to the fore, targeting mainly the United States and its 
allies. Given this background, this study examines the differential response of 
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various foreign financial inflows to post 9/11 terrorist activity. The analysis helps to 
distinguish between the risk profile of foreign investors and remitters in the face of 
terrorism. 
The study uses monthly data on the three financial inflows (FDI, portfolio 
investments, and migrant remittances) as well as the terrorist activity which 
occurred in Pakistan between January 2003 and December 2014. The added 
value of this paper is three-fold:  
Firstly, terrorism is a complex phenomenon resulting from the interaction of 
numerous social, economic and demographic factors which are area specific and 
thus cannot be adequately addressed in a cross-country setting. This study selects 
a developing country that is significant both for the amount of financial flows it 
receives, as well as the level of terrorist violence that has recently occurred in the 
country. In addition, comprehensive monthly data are employed for foreign 
financial flows and terrorism allowing a meaningful empirical investigation. 
 Secondly, the media coverage, and resulting risk perception of terrorist events, 
may vary from country to country; the impact of terrorism on the financial flows a 
country receives may consequently differ according to the countries and regions 
from which they originate. Therefore, the differential effects of the three flows are 
examined with respect to their provenance. 
 Thirdly, unlike most empirical studies on effects of terrorism on the economy 
which focus on a particular form of terrorism (e.g. transnational, domestic, 
business-related), this study considers the global effect of the terrorist activity. 
Along with the casualty count of civilian and security forces (which is taken as the 
principal terrorism indicator), the study evaluates the role of a number of significant 
terrorism incidents, such as bomb blasts and total fatalities,  in shaping the volume 
of financial inflows.  
 
2. Terrorism and Financial Flows: Theoretical Background and Literature 
Overview 
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According to Abadie and Gardeazabal (2008), capital mobility determines the 
equilibrium output level of an open economy. This occurs in two ways: directly 
through the destruction of physical assets, and more importantly, indirectly through 
a decrease in the marginal productivity of capital as a result of the terrorism shock. 
The latter leads potential foreign investors away to safer locations and thus hurts 
the economy's future output which results in low future growth even though the 
short term impact may not be substantial. This clear theoretical derivation has 
found mixed support in the empirical literature. For instance, Li (2006) finds no 
evidence that either anticipated or unanticipated terrorism has any direct effect on 
the location or volume of FDI. In their panel study on US FDI flows to a sample of 
69 countries, Enders, Sachsida and Sandler (2006) find that, although 
transnational terrorist incidents have a statistically significant impact on US FDI in 
OECD countries, the relationship is not visible in non-OECD countries. Similarly, 
Blomberg and Mody (2005) report a qualified support for a negative impact of 
transnational terrorism on host country investments, finding that the relationship 
disappears if country fixed dummy variables are not employed. Power and Choi 
(2012) find that transnational terrorism that targets multinational investments in 
developing countries negatively affects FDI to those countries while non-business-
related terrorism does not show a statistically significant impact. 
 
Other empirical studies have found evidence for an unequivocally negative 
relationship between terrorism and FDI to the developing countries. Alomar and 
El-sakka (2011), for example report a negative impact of terrorism on FDI inflows 
to a sample of 136 developing countries. Likewise, Abadie and Gardeazabal 
(2008) examine the impact of terrorist violence on a cross-section of 186 countries 
and find a negative correlation between direct investments and terrorist violence. A 
one standard deviation increase in terrorist risk is reported to cause a five percent 
decrease in the affected country’s FDI to GDP ratio. Similarly, Lutz and Lutz 
(2006) suggest a substantial fall in the ability of Latin American economies to 
attract inward FDI due to terrorism. 
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 The negative impact of terrorism on FDI flows may be due to several factors: 
Firstly, FDI is typically a long time investment and cannot easily be withdrawn 
without incurring losses. In other words, the investment itself becomes an exit-
barrier for foreign investors (Rivoli & Salorio, 1996). Therefore, MNCs prefer to 
invest in larger and growing economies (Bandera & White, 1968; Lunn, 1980; 
Schneider & Frey, 1985), avoiding economies suffering from slow growth as a 
consequence of terrorism (Abadie and Gardeazabal 2003; Blomberg et al. 2004; 
Tavares 2004). 
Secondly, terrorist incidents create an atmosphere of uncertainty (Abadie and 
Gardeazabal, 2008), and multinational corporations (MNCs) avoid investing in 
such countries. According to Abadie and Gardeazabal, FDI flows to the US fell 
from 15.8% of the Gross Fixed Capital Formation in 2000 to a mere 1.5% in 2003 
in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks. In contrast, US FDI outflows slightly 
increased in the same period. 
Thirdly, terrorism can hurt productivity by raising transaction costs through 
increased security measures (Johnston and Nedelescu, 2005; Abadie and 
Gardeazabal,2008), leading the firm to lose its price competitiveness in the 
international markets (Moshirian,2006). Terrorist incidents trigger a generalized 
drop in asset prices, flight of capital and increase in operational costs for the firms 
(IMF, 2001; Johnston and Nedelescu, 2005).  
Fourthly, governments of terror -stricken countries strengthen security measures 
which leads to higher budgetary allocations. Taxes need to be raised to finance 
these anti terrorism measures. Moreover, financial transactions face increased 
scrutiny as security agencies track potential terrorism financing. The monetary and 
business costs of these steps may deter foreign investors.  
 
A possible reason for lack of consensus in empirical literature with regards to the 
significance and sign of terrorism’s impact on FDI may be the differences in the 
business environment and socioeconomic conditions of the investing countries. 
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Host countries with strong trade, cultural and historic ties with the home country 
may be well known to the investor who can therefore better evaluate the short and 
long-term risks involved in investments. However, home country media may give 
prominent coverage to terrorist activities in such countries which may lead to a 
heightened perception of threats in the investment destinations. The effect of 
terrorism in a country on its FDI inflows may therefore also depend on the extent 
its economic and security situation is known and understood in investing countries, 
and may subsequently vary from country to country. 
 
The impact of terrorism on portfolio investments is likewise found to be negative in 
the empirical literature. Foreign portfolio investments (FPI) are more flexible than 
FDI and can be readily withdrawn from countries facing terrorist activity. Financial 
markets in developed country are more resilient to terrorism activity than those in 
their counterparts in developing countries (Arin et al. 2008; Chen and Siems, 
2004). 
 
Unlike the effects on FDI and FPI flows, the impact of terrorism on migrant 
remittances is ambiguous. Motives for remitting range from purely altruistic to 
purely self-interested. If the migrant maintains strong kinship ties with the country 
of origin and feels emotionally involved in the well being of relatives back home, 
he/she will tend to increase their financial assistance to help cover economic 
losses incurred due to terrorism. These altruistic remittances should therefore rise 
with terrorist violence. Carling, Erdal and Horst (2012), for instance, assert that 
ongoing conflict in the country of origin exerts an upward pressure on the migrants’ 
willingness to remit. 
 The positive remittance behaviour may also correspond to a co-insurance motive 
(Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo 2006) as the migrant remitter helps the stay-behind 
members of the household in turn for their support in times of financial distress. 
 On the other hand, a negative association between terrorism and remittance flows 
points to asset-accumulation and investment-related motives behind remitting 
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(Lukas and Stark 1985), as the migrant makes use of his/her knowledge of 
opportunities back home to invest in profitable ventures. This may particularly be 
the case if the migrant is permanently settled in the host country and considers the 
home country mainly as an investment destination. 
These differences in motives may be evident in differential reactions to terrorism of 
the inflows from different countries. 
 
Terrorism can also affect migration and subsequently have a positive impact on 
remittances through the size effect. Episodes of terrorist violence lead to outflows 
of migrants and refugees and create migrant communities abroad (Berdal 2005; 
Kaldor 2007; Omeje 2007). Dreher, Krieger and Meierrieks (2011) assessed the 
influence of terrorism on skilled migration for 152 countries over the 1976–2000 
period and find robust evidence that terrorism increases skilled emigration, 
suggesting that terrorism affects the cost-benefit considerations of highly educated 
individuals in ways that make emigration more attractive. The resulting larger 
overseas migrant communities eventually lead to higher remittance inflows to the 
terrorism-afflicted country.  
 
Following testable hypotheses can be identified from this discussion of the 
literature: 
 
H1. FDI inflows fall as a result of terrorism.  
This expectation is in line with Abadie and Gardeazabal (2008) capital flow theory 
as well as empirical evidence on the long-run impact of terrorism on FDI to 
developing countries (Alomar and El-sakka 2011; Lutz and Lutz 2006).  
 
H2. The impact of terrorism on portfolio investments is negative.  
During the first decade of this century stock markets of various developing 
countries including Pakistan rose sharply and subsequently attracted fresh capital 
from mature economies. High yield from stock markets in emerging countries 
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compensated for high terrorism-related variance. Nonetheless, sustained terrorist 
campaigns such as the one Pakistan is currently facing, harms the business 
environment and investments are prevented due to heightened risk perception. 
This can happen particularly if terrorist activity hits the country’s major production 
centers. 
 
H3. Migrant remittances rise in response to terrorism.  
Following Anwar and Mughal (2012) and Mughal and Anwar (2014), migrant 
remittances to Pakistan are expected to be predominantly altruistic in nature, and 
as a result may rise when the stay behind households face financial difficulty due 
to increased terrorist activity. 
 
H4. The financial flows’ reaction to terrorism may vary with respect to their 
source regions and countries. 
As described in the next section, Pakistan’s investment and remittance profile is 
diversified with substantial financial inflows received from three distinct regions. 
The list of source countries is likewise varied with source countries differing in 
historic and economic ties and geographical, demographic and economic profile. 
Financial flows may therefore behave differently based on their provenance.   
 
3. Terrorism and Foreign Financial Flows to Pakistan: An overview 
The inflows of FDI and portfolio investments received by Pakistan have fluctuated 
significantly. For instance, FDI flows to Pakistan jumped nine-fold between 2003 
and 2007 to exceed US $5 billion only to fall again below $2 billion in 2011 (Fig. 1). 
FDI inflows often coincide with the country's business cycle, rising during the boom 
periods and falling during low-growth phases. A substantial share of FDI has been 
in the form of privatization receipts for previously state-owned corporations in the 
telecommunication and banking sectors. The United States, Europe and United 
Arab Emirates have historically been the major sources of FDI.  The country’s FDI 
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portfolio is quite diverse with significant investments from countries in the EU, 
North America and Asia (Fig. 2).   
 
Fig. 1. Net FDI to Pakistan (US $ million): 2003 – 2014 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on SBP data (2015) 
 
Fig.  2. Top FDI sources in Pakistan: 2003 - 2014 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on SBP data (2015). 
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Foreign portfolio investments (FPI) to Pakistan have generally stayed low 
compared with other developing countries, and net inflows have surpassed $1 
billion only once (in 2007). Net FPI inflows have been remarkably unstable. For 
instance the flows were negative for five of the thirteen years since 2001 (Fig. 3). 
The United States, UAE and UK account for much of the FPI investments the 
country receives (Fig. 4). 
 
 
Fig. 3. Net foreign portfolio investment in Pakistan (US $ million): 2003 – 
2014 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on SBP data (2015). 
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Fig.  4: Top sources of net foreign portfolio investment in Pakistan: 2003 -
2014 
 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on SBP data (2015). 
 
In comparison, Pakistan received over US $12 billion migrant remittances in 2014 
(Fig. 5), making it one of the top ten recipients of formal remittances in the world 
(State Bank of Pakistan 2013; World Bank 2011). Remittances comprise six 
percent of the country's GDP, surpassing the combined share of international 
capital inflows to Pakistan. The volume of formal remittances has risen sharply in 
the last decade, growing ten-fold between 2001 and 20141. The energy-rich states 
of the Persian Gulf are the main source of remittance flows to Pakistan along with 
North America and Europe (Fig. 6). Remittances to the country are considered a 
relatively stable source of foreign exchange (Mughal and Makhlouf, 2011), and are 
shown to be contra cyclical (Ahmed 2012).  
 
 
1 For a recent account of the evolution and development impact of remittances to Pakistan, see for example Mughal (2013). 
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Fig. 5. Foreign remittances to Pakistan (US $ million): 2003 – 2014 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on SBP data (2015). 
 
Fig. 6. Top 5 remittance source countries: 2003-2014 
 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on SBP data (2015). 
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Pakistan’s economy remains vulnerable to macroeconomic shocks arising within 
or outside the country's frontiers. Terrorism is one such shock that has hit the 
economy in the last decade. Although Pakistan has faced bouts of ethnic, 
separatist and sectarian violence in the past, anti-state militant activity surged 
spectacularly in the aftermath of 9/11 as the country joined the US-led campaign 
against Al-Qaida and the Taliban2. The number of deaths in terrorist attacks rose 
from 164 in 2003 to 3739 in 2012, before falling to 2314 in 2014 (Table 1). Most of 
the attacks have been carried out by the militant group Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan 
(TTP) followed by Baloch separatist groups and sectarian militants (Pakistan 
Security Report 2012). Target killings, bomb blasts, improvised explosive devices 
and rocket attacks have been the terrorists' main tactics. 
 
Table 1: Terrorism in Pakistan (2003 -2014) 
Year 
Number of 
Deaths 
Civilian 
Deaths 
Security 
Forces 
Deaths 
Terrorist' 
Deaths 
Number of 
Major 
Incidents 
Number 
of Bomb 
Blasts 
2003 164 140 24 25 12 42 
2004 619 435 184 244 23 137 
2005 511 430 81 137 18 245 
2006 933 608 325 538 42 300 
2007 2119 1522 597 1479 157 677 
2008 2809 2155 654 3906 243 598 
2009 3315 2324 991 8389 364 499 
2010 2265 1796 469 5170 348 463 
2011 3503 2738 765 2800 269 635 
2012 3739 3007 732 2472 255 648 
2013 3677 3001 676 1702 345 375 
2014 2314 1781 533 3182 401 375 
Grand 
Total 
25968 19937 6031 30044 2477 4994 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on SATP data (2015). 
2 For a brief background on the origins of terrorism in Pakistan, see Mehmood (2013). 
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 Terrorism has exacted a heavy cost on the country, both in terms of lives and 
limbs as well as in material losses. According to Mehmood (2013), terrorism has 
cumulatively cost Pakistan 33.02 percent of its real national income during the 
1973-2010 period, implying around one percent of lost real GDP per capita growth 
every year. 
 
4. Data and Methodology 
4.1. Data Description 
Monthly time series for FDI, portfolio investments and migrant remittances are 
taken from Pakistan's central bank, the State Bank of Pakistan (SBP). All the 
series are in current US Dollars and are converted into constant US Dollars. FDI 
comprise investments by foreign corporations acquiring at least ten percent 
ownership of the local business. Investments involving less than ten percent 
foreign investor share are deemed portfolio investments. In addition to aggregate 
flows, both FDI and FPI are analyzed with respect to their source regions and 
countries. The regions considered are Asia, North America, and Western Europe. 
The list of countries for the constituent regions is given in Table A-5 in the 
appendix. United States, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, Netherlands and 
Switzerland were Pakistan’s top five FDI sources during the examined period, 
while the top five FPI senders were USA, UAE, UK, Singapore and Luxembourg. 
Remittances comprise the sum of workers’ remittances, compensation of 
employees, and migrants’ transfers. In addition to aggregate inflows, remittances 
from three major remitting regions and top five remitting countries are also 
considered. The regions included are Persian Gulf, North America and Europe3 4. 
3 Unlike FDI and FPI, migrant remittances from Asia overwhelmingly originate in the Persian Gulf. Therefore, the latter can 
be taken as representing Asia. Similarly, FDI and FPI to Pakistan arriving from Europe originate almost exclusively in 
Western Europe. Therefore, the region is comparable to the Europe region taken as the source of remittance inflows. 
4 The variable for Persian Gulf comprises observations for the six states of Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), namely 
Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates, while those for North America and Europe 
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Pakistan's top five sending countries during the period analyzed includes Saudi 
Arabia, United Arab Emirates, United States, United Kingdom and Kuwait. 
Together, these five account for the bulk of Pakistan’s remittance inflows. 
 
Following Mughal and Anwar (2014), data on terrorism are taken from the South 
Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP). Studies on other countries and regions have often 
been based on data from Global Terrorism Database (GTD) maintained by the 
University of Maryland National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and 
Response to Terrorism Center. 
For South Asian countries however, including Pakistan, SATP provides more 
comprehensive data from 2003 onwards5. 
 
Terrorism in this study pertains to both domestic and transnational attacks, 
although given the country context; attacks are overwhelmingly against domestic 
targets. Terrorism is defined as “an act or acts of criminal violence, or the 
sequence of actions leading to such an act or acts, which is/are intended to 
intimidate the public, coerce or unduly compel a government or public authority to 
perform or abstain from performing any act; or to destabilize or destroy the 
fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social structures of a country; or 
to overawe any public functionary or government agency” (SATP 2013).  
 
We take the number of civilian and security -force fatalities in terrorist attacks as 
our main terrorism indicator. The reason for this choice is the following: during the 
period examined, the number of terrorism incidents in the country has been very 
high (as many as 47 terrorism incidents took place in a month involving three or 
more deaths). In such a situation, it is the intensity of attacks reflected in the 
number of deaths that is more significant than the incident count itself. As a 
respectively consist of Canada and USA, and Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, 
Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. 
5 Estimations are also carried out using the GTD database as a robustness measure. The results are similar to the study’s 
main findings, and are not shown. 
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robustness check, the analysis is carried out using an alternative definition of the 
variable, including insurgent deaths in the death count. We also carry out the 
analysis using the number of incidents involving three or more deaths as well as 
the number of bomb blasts carried out during a month.  
 
Monthly data for Pakistan's Consumer Price Index (CPI), interest rate and nominal 
exchange rate used in addition to the robustness checks are taken from the SBP. 
The terrorism series began from January 2003. As a result, the dataset contains a 
maximum of 144 observations for the January 2003 – December 2014 period. 
Summary statistics of the dataset are given in Table 2. An average of 180 people 
lost their lives every month during the examined period (excluding terrorists), while 
there was an average of 17 incidents involving three or more deaths per month. 
 
Table 2: Summary Statistics 
Number of Observations: 144 
Variable         Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max 
Aggregate Net Foreign Direct Investment 165.84 168.06 -30.28 1010.68 
Net Foreign Direct Investment  from United States  33.29 33.97 -2.04 291.64 
Net Foreign Direct Investment  from UAE  23.53 70.55 -87.09 548.15 
Net Foreign Direct Investment  from UK  20.92 36.63 -32.78 318.80 
Net Foreign Direct Investment  from Netherlands  10.65 20.79 -30.15 186.38 
Net Foreign Direct Investment  from  Switzerland 7.41 37.44 -105.68 363.05 
Aggregate Net Foreign Portfolio Investment 36.41 162.10 -245.97 1562.22 
Net Foreign Portfolio Investment  from USA  13.88 44.50 -106.10 221.40 
Net Foreign Portfolio Investment  from UK  1.40 5.06 -15.01 32.42 
Net Foreign Portfolio Investment  from UAE  4.89 48.14 -98.99 505.52 
Net Foreign Portfolio Investment  from 
Luxembourg 
2.47 7.56 -13.90 58.71 
Net Foreign Portfolio Investment  from Singapore 0.54 10.41 -50.40 75.50 
Aggregate Foreign Remittances 590.80 261.87 240.19 1263.13 
Remittances from USA 121.00 26.49 74.63 203.73 
Remittances from UK 63.93 42.49 19.21 182.19 
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Remittances from Saudi Arabia 140.84 94.90 31.71 372.17 
Remittances from UAE 117.79 63.08 34.81 289.99 
Remittances from Kuwait 28.22 10.34 10.84 56.57 
Exchange Rate 76.36 16.65 57.33 107.51 
Pakistan CPI (2010=100) 87.57 32.35 46.41 144.99 
Death Count including terrorists 388.94 351.04 1.00 2024.00 
Death Count 180.33 130.30 0.00 507.00 
Civilian Death Count 138.45 107.26 0.00 432.00 
Security Forces Death Count 41.88 34.43 0.00 157.00 
Insurgents Death Count 208.64 264.00 0.00 1590.00 
Number of Bomb Blasts 34.68 20.65 0.00 104.00 
Major Incidents 17.20 13.02 0.00 47.00 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on SATP and SBP data (2015). 
 
4.2. Methodology 
The time series included in the study are found to have a moving average 
component6. Moreover, terrorism is found to be exogenous with respect to the 
financial flows7. Given these characteristics of the dataset, the Autoregressive 
Integrated Moving Average (ARIMA) group of econometric techniques is 
considered pertinent for the analysis. The ARMAX model is chosen as the 
mainstay of the study. The general ARMAX (p, q) model in the context of our study 
can be expressed as: 
 
FFi,t = α + β1 FFi,t-1 + .... + βp FFi,t-p + Ɣ0Tt +  Ɣ1Tt-1 + Ɛt - Ɵ1 Ɛt-1 - .... - ƟqƐt-q 
Where 'FF' represents the financial flow for the month t, ‘T’ is the terrorism 
indicator for the corresponding month and ℇ is the disturbance term. To apply 
ARMAX, the variables must be stationary, i.e. with constant mean and variance as 
well as constant auto- covariance over time.  
We begin our empirical analysis by determining the level of stationarity of the 
aggregate, regional and country-wise financial flow series. Graphic evidence 
6 The moving-average nature was tested using the Auto-Correlation (AC) and Partial Auto-Correlation (PAC) graphs 
7Endogeneity was determined using the Wu-Hausman specification test 
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suggests that all the series are non-stationary at levels, but turn stationary at first 
difference. The graphical evidence is confirmed by unit root tests (Table A-1in the 
Appendix). Appropriate lag structure is determined for the tests using the Akaike's 
Information Criterion (AIC) and the Schwarz Bayesian Information Criterion (SBIC) 
(Table A-1). The next step is to obtain the autocorrelation and partial-
autocorrelation functions in order to determine the adequate lags for the 
aggregate, regional and top five country ARMAX models. The corresponding lags 
for the autocorrelation (AR) and moving average (MA) specifications obtained for 
the baseline models are given in Tables A-2. AIC and SBIC criteria are used to 
select the appropriate ARMAX models among suggested competing lag 
specifications. Most of the specifications thus selected are ARMAX (1,1,1). All the 
estimations are carried out using robust standard errors in order to control for 
potential heteroskedasticity in the models. Post-estimation tests are performed to 
check for autocorrelation in residuals (shown in Table A-3). 
Granger causality test (Table A-4) shows that all the financial flows have one 
directional association with terrorism, running from terrorism to the financial 
inflow8. 
 
5. Findings 
Tables 3 to 5 present results for aggregate and country wise financial inflows. As 
shown in Tables 3 and 5, FDI and migrant remittances appear to react to the 
terrorism indicator (number of civilian and security-force fatalities) in a statistically 
significant manner, portfolio flows being insignificant (Table 4). The signs of 
association for FDI and remittances are opposite, though, and suggest the fact 
that the motives facing foreign investors and overseas Pakistani remitters are not 
the same. The coefficient of FDI's negative association with terrorism is a strong 
0.05, implying a marginal effect of -0.38; one additional terrorism-related death is 
associated with a $0.38 million drop in FDI inflows. In comparison, remittances 
show a marginal rise of $0.09 million per additional death. 
8 Li and Schaub (2004) also find no significant impact of FDI, FPI or migrant remittances on terrorism 
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Table 3. Aggregate and top 5 countries Net FDI inflows and terrorism 
(ARMAX) 
 
 
These differential impacts are also evident in region-wise results9. FDI inflows from 
all the major source regions show strong negative association with terrorism. 
Similar to aggregate estimation, region-wise results for migrant remittances are all 
positive and significant. However, terrorism seems to have a small and marginally 
significant association with remittances from North America, which possibly points 
to a different socioeconomic profile of the North American Pakistani diaspora 
compared with the migrant communities located in the Persian Gulf and Europe. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
9 The results explaining relationship between terrorism and region wise financial flows are not provided here and available 
upon request.  
ARIMA (1,1,1) ARIMA (1,1,1) ARIMA (1,1,1) ARIMA (1,1,1) ARIMA (1,1,1) ARIMA (1,1,1)
1 2 3 4 5 6
VARIABLES FDI_aggregate FDI_USA FDI_UAE FDI_UK FDI_Netherlands FDI_Switzerland
Terrorism -0.0489*** -0.0092*** -0.0072 -0.0047*** -0.0009 -0.0038
(0.0143) (0.0029) (0.0054) (0.0015) (0.0007) (0.0034)
AR (1) 0.1171 0.1030 0.3831 0.0574 -0.0634*** 0.3604**
(0.1322) (0.1315) (0.2753) (0.0411) (0.0228) (0.1585)
MA(1) -0.8969*** -0.8491*** -1.0000*** -1.0000*** -1.0000*** -1.0000***
(0.0277) (0.0907) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
sigma 131.5268*** 25.6720*** 62.9387*** 35.2791*** 20.6321*** 34.0676***
(15.3618) (6.9932) (14.0652) (10.3336) (5.7386) (12.3909)
Constant 9.5166*** 1.7223** 1.1598 0.9249*** 0.1528 0.6674
(3.6245) (0.8140) (1.1695) (0.3242) (0.1502) (0.7307)
Observations 143 143 143 143 143 143
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 4. Aggregate and top 5 countries Net FPI inflows and terrorism 
(ARMAX models) 
 
 
Among the three major overseas communities, the North American Pakistani 
community is the wealthiest and the most educationally qualified (Mughal 2013; 
Oda 2009), and mostly comprises permanent migrants who may have a more 
investment-oriented perspective with respect to the home-country. The altruism-
driven response to terrorism back home may thus be partially compensated by the 
community's investment-motivated reaction to organized violence.    
 
The association between foreign portfolio investments and terrorism is negative for 
both the aggregate and country-wise estimations as expected (Table 4). However, 
most of the estimations are statistically insignificant. The predominantly weak 
significance of FPI’s association also suggests the presence of a factor which pulls 
portfolio investments in the opposite direction. Being more footloose than FDI, 
portfolio investments seek high yields in spite of high security risks as it is always 
possible to withdraw if the host economy is confronted with a shock. This has 
ARIMA (1,1,1) AR(4) I(1) MA (1) ARIMA (1,1,1) ARIMA (1,1,1) AR(2) I(1) MA (1) ARIMA (1,1,1)
1 2 3 4 5 6
VARIABLES PFI_aggregate PFI_USA PFI_UAE PFI_UK PFI_Singapore PFI_Luxemburg
Terrorism -0.0005 -0.0040 -0.0001 -0.0025 -0.0004 0.0006
(0.0123) (0.0029) (0.0002) (0.0030) (0.0006) (0.0004)
AR(1) -0.0561 -0.1471 -0.1080 0.4401**
(0.0655) (0.1348) (0.1009) (0.2061)
AR(2) -0.1769
(0.2173)
AR(4) 0.3194***
(0.1227)
MA(1) -0.8503*** -1.0000*** -1.0000*** -1.0000*** -1.0000*** -1.0000***
-0.1626 0 0 0 0 0
sigma 160.9802*** 41.4343*** 4.9637*** 47.4907*** 10.1919*** 6.2302***
(52.4135) (4.1890) (0.8146) (17.6100) (2.2168) (1.0298)
Constant 1.3542 0.7682 0.0163 0.4798 0.0675 -0.0548
(2.4956) (0.6405) (0.0461) (0.6396) (0.1212) (0.0661)
Observations 143 143 143 143 143 143
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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become increasingly possible thanks to financial globalization and advances in 
information and telecommunications technology.  
 
Table 5. Aggregate and top 5 countries remittance inflows and terrorism 
(ARMAX models) 
 
 
 
These findings corroborate the conclusions of a growing body of business 
literature that highlights the security risk-averse nature of foreign private capital. 
FDI usually denotes a long-term engagement with the host country and therefore 
requires trust in the prospects of the local economy. The higher security, 
insurance, transportation and production costs that result from terrorism-related 
uncertainty erode this trust and make the investors look for less risky avenues 
(Blomberg, Hess and Tan 2011; Frey, Luechinger and Stutzer 2007; Gaibulloev 
and Sandler 2011). Our findings are in contrast with those of Mehmood (2013) 
who fails to ascertain adverse effects of terrorism on FDI to Pakistan over the 
1973-2010 period. In addition to different analytical tools employed, the two 
ARIMA (1,1,1) ARIMA (1,1,1) AR(6) I(1) MA (1) ARIMA (1,1,1) ARIMA (1,1,1) AR(8) I(1) MA (1) 
1 2 3 4 5 6
VARIABLES Remit_aggregate Remit_USA Remit_Saudi Arabia Remit_UAE Remit_UK Remit_Kuwait
Terrorism 0.0219* 0.0005 0.0083*** 0.0065 0.0062*** 0.0007
(0.0116) (0.0008) (0.0029) (0.0062) (0.0015) (0.0006)
AR(1) -0.0752 0.2899*** -0.2289 0.2906
(0.4135) (0.0936) (0.6017) (0.2234)
AR(6) -0.1997
(0.1272)
AR(8) -0.2448***
(0.0938)
MA(1) -0.7548* -1.0000*** -0.6901*** -0.3772 -0.9402*** -0.7365***
(0.4367) (0.0000) (0.0783) (0.6242) (0.1556) (0.1158)
sigma 63.3339*** 15.0906*** 16.9522*** 17.9507*** 11.0626*** 3.3363***
(4.7655) (1.1291) (1.5028) (1.5343) (1.0390) (0.2625)
Constant 1.4535 0.4019*** 0.5468 0.0708 -0.3148 0.0633
(1.8518) (0.1471) (0.4590) (0.9715) (0.2814) (0.1130)
Observations 143 143 143 143 143 143
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
21 
 
studies differ in the time scale and the period examined, suggesting that the long-
term impact of terrorism on FDI may vary from its short-run effects. 
 
In contrast to international private capital flows, migrant remittances to Pakistan 
chiefly correspond to altruistic motives. Migrants tend to remit more back home to 
help their family members or compatriots in general cope with terrorism-induced 
economic losses. This rise in remittances can also be due to increased migration 
of the more mobile sections of the population (especially that of skilled workers 
and professionals).  
 
6. Robustness checks 
A. Post estimation tests 
The estimated sets of ARMAX models need to be tested for the presence of white 
noise in the residuals. No autocorrelation of the estimated residuals is a 
prerequisite for good model fit. The models appear to be normally distributed. 
Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) and Phillip-Peron (PP) tests indicate no evidence 
of autocorrelation in residuals (Table A-3).   
 
B. Estimations using alternate definitions of terrorism 
We estimate the baseline aggregate models using several alternative definitions of 
terrorism. Table 6 shows the reaction of financial inflows to an incident count of the 
terrorist activity. A somewhat similar picture emerges. FDI from all source regions 
are significant and negative (country and regional level results are not shown). FDI 
from the developing countries (particularly those from Asia) show a strong drop in 
response to terrorism. Here too, portfolio investments retain their lack of 
significance on aggregate, region and country level. However, the behaviour of 
migrant remittance inflows changes. Even though the positive sign remains, many 
of the aggregate, regional and top five country estimations are no longer 
significant at the 10% significance level.  
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Table 6. Aggregate flows and major terrorism incidents (ARMAX models) 
 
 
Table 7. Aggregate flows and bomb blasts count (ARMAX models) 
 
ARIMA (1,1,1) ARIMA (1,1,1) ARIMA (1,1,1)
1 2 3
VARIABLES Aggregate Net FDI Aggregate Net FPI Aggregate Remittances
Major Incidents -0.4421*** 0.0621 0.2413***
(0.1214) (0.1175) (0.0227)
AR(1) 0.1324 -0.0546 0.0954
(0.1334) (0.0634) (0.1141)
MA(1) -0.9139*** -0.9119*** -1.0000***
(0.0311) (0.0542) (0.0000)
Sigma 131.4714*** 160.8052*** 60.9281***
(15.1425) (51.9947) (4.6464)
Constant 7.8688*** 0.1675 1.5585***
(2.9939) (1.7584) (0.3459)
Observations 143 143 143
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
AR(2) I(1) MA (1) AR(7) I(1) MA (1) ARIMA(1,1,1)
1 2 3
VARIABLES Aggregate Net FDI Aggregate Net PFI Aggregate Remittances
Bomb_Blasts -0.3075*** -0.1160** 0.1124
(0.1097) (0.0523) (0.0760)
AR(1) -0.1176
(0.5430)
AR(2) -0.1515*
(0.0904)
AR(7) -0.0642
(0.0473)
MA(1) -0.8262*** -0.9181*** -0.7025
(0.0701) (0.0365) (0.5865)
sigma 131.8475*** 159.9187*** 63.6083***
(16.8526) (52.8470) (4.6920)
Constant 11.5315*** 5.6050** 1.4587
(4.3577) (2.6576) (2.8392)
Observations 143 143 143
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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 We check the relationship between foreign financial flows and terrorism using 
another terrorism indicator: Bomb blasts are a major terrorism tactic in Pakistan. 
Results shown in Table 7 corroborate the findings of the incident count models. 
Although portfolio investments show significantly negative reaction to the number 
of bomb blasts carried out during a month, remittance receipts remain insignificant. 
 
Finally, we estimate the terrorism – financial flows relationship employing another 
definition of terrorism by including the reported number of terrorists in the death 
count. Results given in Table 8 confirm the findings of our baseline models with all 
results maintaining their respective significance.  
 
 
Table 8. Aggregate flows and terrorism – death count including terrorists 
(ARMAX models) 
 
 
 
ARIMA (1,1,1) ARIMA (1,1,1) ARIMA (1,1,1)
1 1 1
VARIABLES Aggregate Net FDI Aggregate Net PFI Aggregate Remittances
Terrorism [death count including terrorists] -0.0209*** -0.0014 0.0083**
(0.0032) (0.0026) (0.0035)
AR(1) 0.1176 -0.0553 -0.0724
(0.1277) (0.0633) (0.4086)
MA(1) -1.0000*** -0.9115*** -0.7574*
(0.0000) (0.0514) (0.4362)
sigma 124.9648*** 160.9316*** 63.3309***
(14.8709) (52.4230) (4.7735)
Constant 8.8198*** 1.8233 2.2083
(1.5998) (2.0604) (1.4076)
Observations 143 143 143
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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C. Estimations using other macroeconomic drivers of foreign financial flows 
Financial inflows interact with various macroeconomic factors. Investors can 
modify their investment plans in view of exchange-rate variations. Similarly, if 
remittances are sent for investment in the local economy, depreciation may cause 
the remitter to delay or reconsider his/her investment decisions. A depreciating 
currency often signals deteriorating economic conditions. This may dissuade an 
investment-motivated migrant from remitting. However, if the migrant sends money 
to help the household maintain a certain standard of living; he/she will now need a 
lower amount of foreign currency to consume the same goods basket given the 
higher purchasing power of the foreign currency. Likewise, local market interest 
and inflation rates can affect the flow of foreign capital (Agarwal 1997; Tangjitprom 
2012). The relationship between foreign financial flows and terrorism can be 
affected as a result. To account for this possibility, we estimate the aggregate 
models adding three macroeconomic variables, nominal exchange rate, Consumer 
Price Index (CPI) and interest rate. The results shown in Table 9 confirm our 
baseline results with all the models maintaining their signs, significance and 
respective coefficients. It should be noted here that, given that the data is monthly, 
other potentially important drivers of foreign flows such as growth in national 
output and domestic investment cannot be included in the aforementioned models.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
25 
 
Table 9. Aggregate flows and terrorism (ARMAX models including 
macroeconomic indicators) 
 
 
7. Concluding Remarks 
In the aftermath of the Sep 11 2001 terrorist attacks on the Twin Towers in New 
York, terrorism has become an everyday issue for many developing countries. At 
the same time, foreign financial flows have boomed as increasing amounts of 
private capital and migrant remittances have found home in many developing 
countries. In this study, we sought to analyze the response of foreign financial 
flows to terrorism. Using monthly data for the January 2003 - December 2014 
period, we examined the relationship between terrorism and FDI, portfolio 
investments and migrant remittances to Pakistan. We found a substantial 
difference between the behaviour of these inflows in the face of terrorism. Private 
capital flows, particularly FDI, demonstrate a sizeable drop due to terrorist activity, 
1 2 3
VARIABLES Aggregate Net FDI Aggregate Net FPI Aggregate Remittances
Terrorism -0.0296*** -0.0188** 0.0051**
(0.0065) (0.0080) (0.0026)
Exchange Rate 0.2219 1.6523** -0.2858
(0.7637) (0.6682) (0.2316)
CPI -0.0448 -0.7134** 0.1979*
(0.3716) (0.2898) (0.1151)
Money Market Rate 6.2079 4.6057 4.8033**
(3.9303) (4.2013) (1.8743)
AR(1) 0.0922 -0.0983 0.0721
(0.1273) (0.0788) (0.1158)
MA(1) -1.0000*** -1.0000*** -1.0000***
(0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000)
sigma 123.3920*** 150.6814*** 60.1232***
(14.7520) (43.8705) (4.8976)
Constant 0.2405 -54.0693** 8.5797
(23.8904) (22.0050) (7.1437)
Observations 143 143 143
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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whereas migrant remittances show an increase. Region- and country-wise flows 
indicate no specificities suggesting that investors and remitters from all the major 
source areas react in a similar fashion to bouts of terrorism.   
 
In December 2014, a horrific terrorist attack on a school in North West Pakistan 
left 150 dead, most of them children. This widely mediatized attack has led to a 
strong response by the country’s security forces. Terrorist networks are being 
actively targeted, sleeper cells in urban areas are being destroyed, and the anti-
terrorism judicial proceedings have been streamlined and accelerated. Part of the 
response to this challenge will ultimately have to be to offer economic incentives to 
the marginalized sections of the society. The findings of this study lead to certain 
economic policy implications in this regard: Foreign investments abstain from 
countries facing sustained terrorism activity. Governments of such countries 
should therefore not expect major FDI inflows while the security situation is not 
well under control. Instead of courting illusive foreign investors, a more productive 
strategy could be to provide a better business environment at home, allowing local 
businesses to create new jobs and expand production. Even though the terrorists 
may not target the businesses directly, it is the business companies that ultimately 
face the cost of insecurity. Better performance of existing businesses which in turn 
improve the local economic situation creates a disincentive for terrorists by raising 
the opportunity cost of terrorism. Another means of boosting the local economy 
can be to encourage migrant remittances by lowering remitting costs and 
facilitating more productive use of remittances. Given their relatively stable and 
countercyclical nature, remittances can be relied upon, in the short-term, to keep 
afloat a developing economy suffering from terrorism. Measures to tax these 
remittances may prove counterproductive. 
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List of Appendices 
Table A-1. Unit root tests for FDI , FPI and Remittances 
Time Series 
        
Number of lags  
As per AIC/SBIC 
criteria  
ADF test statistics 
(τ) 
PP test statistics 
(τ) 
Critical Value (at 5 
%)  
Aggregate Net Foreign Direct Investment (D1) 3 -9.43 -20.02 -2.89 
Net Foreign Direct Investment  from United 
  
2 -8.663 -20.686 -2.89 
Net Foreign Direct Investment  from UAE (D1) 4 -8.12 -16.002 -2.89 
Net Foreign Direct Investment  from UK (D1) 3 -8.882 -24.39 -2.89 
Net Foreign Direct Investment  from Netherlands 
 
4 -7.823 -16.247 -2.89 
Net Foreign Direct Investment  from  
  
4 -8.216 -28.081 -2.89 
Aggregate Net Foreign Portfolio Investment  
 
3 -7.966 -32.74 -2.89 
Net Foreign Portfolio Investment  from United 
  
4 -6.989 -35.483 -2.89 
Net Foreign Portfolio Investment  from UAE (D1) 3 -9.002 -30.918 -2.89 
Net Foreign Portfolio Investment  from UK (D1) 3 -8.412 -26.068 -2.89 
Net Foreign Portfolio Investment  from 
  
3 -8.52 -26.399 -2.89 
Net Foreign Portfolio Investment  from  
  
2 -8.814 -17.912 -2.89 
Aggregate Remittances (D1) 2 -8.306 -21.373 -2.89 
Remittances from USA (D1) 2 -8.146 -17.979 -2.89 
Remittances from Saudi Arabia (D1) 1 -8.551 -16.712 -2.89 
Remittances from UAE (D1) 1 -9.68 -15.851 -2.89 
Remittances from UK (D1) 3 -7.217 -17.151 -2.89 
Remittances from Kuwait (D1) 1 -9.645 -17.104 -2.89 
 
Note: D1 = stationary at first difference 
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Table A-2. Lags Selection for FDI and FPI ARMAX Models 
Time Series 
       
Number of lags 
for autoregressive 
term ‘ p’ 
Number of lags for 
moving average 
term ‘ q’ 
Aggregate Net Foreign Direct Investment (D1) 1, 2, 4, 5, 8 1 , 6 
Net Foreign Direct Investment  from United States (D1) 1, 2 1, 2, 3, 6 
Net Foreign Direct Investment  from UAE (D1) 1, 2, 4, 8 1, 2 
Net Foreign Direct Investment  from UK (D1) 1, 2, 3, 5 1 
Net Foreign Direct Investment  from Netherlands (D1) 1, 2, 4 1, 2 
Net Foreign Direct Investment  from  Switzerland (D1) 1, 2, 3, 4, 10, 11 1 
Aggregate Net Foreign Portfolio Investment  (D1) 1, 2, 3, 7 1, 4, 5 
Net Foreign Portfolio Investment  from United States (D1) 1,3, 4 1, 2, 3, 4 
Net Foreign Portfolio Investment  from UAE (D1) 1, 2, 3, 6, 8 1 
Net Foreign Portfolio Investment  from UK (D1) 1, 2, 3, 5, 7 1 
Net Foreign Portfolio Investment  from Singapore (D1) 1, 2, 3 1, 2, 4, 5 
Net Foreign Portfolio Investment  from  Luxembourg (D1) 1, 2, 6, 7 1 
Aggregate Remittances (D1) 1 1 
Remittances from USA (D1) 1, 8, 12 1 
Remittances from Saudi Arabia (D1) 1, 6, 8 1, 6, 8 
Remittances from UAE (D1) 1, 5 1 
Remittances from UK (D1) 1, 3 1 
Remittances from Kuwait (D1) 1, 7 1 
 Note: D1 = stationary at first difference 
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 Table A-3. ADF and PP tests for Residuals 
Time Series  
ADF test 
statistics (τ) 
on 
 
PP test 
statistics (τ) 
on Residuals 
Critical 
Value    
(at 5 %)  
Aggregate Net Foreign Direct Investment -11.018 -11.017 -2.89 
Net Foreign Direct Investment  from United States  -11.026 -11.045 -2.89 
Net Foreign Direct Investment  from UAE  -10.473 -10.464 -2.89 
Net Foreign Direct Investment  from UK  -10.521 -10.523 -2.89 
Net Foreign Direct Investment  from Netherlands  -10.448 -10.435 -2.89 
Net Foreign Direct Investment  from  Switzerland -11.21 -11.257 -2.89 
Aggregate Net Foreign Portfolio Investment  (D1) -11.251 -11.253 -2.89 
Net Foreign Portfolio Investment  from United States 
 
-10.743   -10.738 -2.89 
Net Foreign Portfolio Investment  from UAE (D1) -11.078 -11.099 -2.89 
Net Foreign Portfolio Investment  from UK (D1) -11.127 -11.129 -2.89 
Net Foreign Portfolio Investment  from Singapore (D1) -11.113   -11.113 -2.89 
Net Foreign Portfolio Investment  from  Luxembourg 
 
-11.244 -11.249   -2.89 
Aggregate Remittances (D1) -11.190 -11.211 -2.89 
Remittances from USA (D1) -11.311 -11.306 -2.89 
Remittances from Saudi Arabia (D1) -10.488 -10.505 -2.89 
Remittances from UAE (D1)   -11.369   -11.348 -2.89 
Remittances from UK (D1) -10.316 -10.338    -2.89 
Remittances from Kuwait (D1) -11.007 -11.090 -2.89 
Table A-4. Test for Granger causality (Aggregate models)  
Model  F-Statistics  Prob > F 
Aggregate Net Foreign Direct Investment   F(  4,   113) =    1.49             Prob > F =    0.2097 
Aggregate Net Foreign Portfolio Investment   F(  4,   113) =    2.35             Prob > F =    0.0887 
Aggregate Remittances   F(  4,   112) =    1.52             Prob > F =    0.2004 
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Table A-5. List of source countries and regions for FDI and FPI  
Developed countries: Luxembourg, Denmark, France, Germany, Netherlands, 
Sweden, U.K, Norway, Switzerland, Canada, U.S.A, Australia, Japan 
Developing countries : Libya,  Egypt, Mauritius, South Africa, Oman, Iran, 
Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, U.A.E, Bangladesh, China, Hong 
Kong, Malaysia, Singapore, India, Korea (South), Caribbean Islands, Cayman 
Island, Bahamas 
Asia: Oman, Iran, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, U.A.E, 
Bangladesh, China, Hong Kong, Malaysia, Singapore, India, Korea (South) 
Western Europe: Luxembourg, Denmark, France, Germany, Netherlands, 
Sweden, U.K, Norway, Switzerland 
North America: Canada, U.S.A 
Africa: Libya, Egypt, Mauritius, South Africa 
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